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RESPONSE TO APPELLEES* STATEMENT uF ISSUES 
Appellant Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Utah ("BCBSU") 
disputes the assertion of Plaintiffs/Appellees, ("Tlaintiffs") 
t ha I I. In Il i MI IL i i d , mi "i, HI mi ii II iiiiiili • ii Il n-iii, I.iicil 1 u ' l i h iu j " II ha t I,hey were 
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upon thirty days written notice for any reason whatsoever other 
than the health of the subscriber. This issue is, however, 
irrelevant to this appeal. 
3. Plaintiffs' paragraph three is correct/ but 
irrelevant. 
4. BCBSU does not dispute the assertions of 
paragraph four, but they are disputed by other parties, 
unestablished as yet, and irrelevant to this appeal. 
5. The assertions of paragraph five are essentially 
true, but irrelevant. 
6. The facts asserted in paragraph six, in 
particular the bald assertion that "Uninsureds will never be 
able to obtain health insurance coverage for the chronic and 
serious illnesses that they experience," are not established in 
the record, and are disputed. They are also completely 
irrelevant to this appeal. 
7. Plaintiffs' attempt to explain in paragraph seven 
their reasons for not originally naming BCBSU as a defendant is 
gratuitous and improper. No citation to the record supports 
this assertion; it is not established by the testimony of any 
witness, and may not be relied upon on appeal. 
8. Similarly, plaintiffs' assertion in paragraph 
eight that "the named defendants began pointing their fingers 
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at BCBSU" is unsupported in the record, and may not be 
introduced on appeal. 
9. Paragraph nine contains even more egregious 
efforts to supplement the record on appeal with unproven 
facts. Plaintiffs allege that "on September 13, 1988 
Uninsureds informed counsel for BCBSU that because of the 
information obtained in the Mr. West's deposition" they would 
add BCBSU as a defendant. BCBSU denies that it was informed at 
this early date that it would be named as a defendant; nothing 
in the record establishes this fact, no citation to the record 
supports it, and it was not a part of the record reviewed by 
the trial court in reaching its decision. 
10. In paragraph ten, plaintiffs assert that on 
September 27, 1988 BCBSU requested that depositions previously 
scheduled be continued so that BCBSU could be present. BCBSU 
disputes the assertion; it is unfounded in the record, no 
citation to the record is given (the only citation is to the 
notice establishing that the depositions were continued), the 
trial court did not consider any such evidence, and the attempt 
to distort the record in this manner is objectionable. 
11. Paragraphs eleven, twelve and thirteen are true. 
12. Paragraph fourteen represents another unwarranted 
attempt to expand the record. While it is true that plaintiffs 
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served a request for production of documents on December 12, 
there is no basis in the record for stating that "uninsureds 
began preparing their case against BCBSU" on this date. 
13. Paragraphs fifteen through twenty-eight are true, 
except that BCBSU "participated" in the deposition of Jack 
Sheets only to the extent that its counsel defended the 
deposition and asserted appropriate objections; no questions 
were posed by BCBSU to Mr. Sheets. 
14. Paragraph twenty-nine includes yet another 
improper attempt to supplement the record on appeal. 
Plaintiffs' assertion that they "finalized document preparation 
for their case against BCBSU" is unsupported in the record; the 
fact that document requests were served is the only matter of 
record. 
15. Similarly, in paragraph thirty, plaintiffs claim, 
without any support in the record, that they "began preparing 
their response" to interrogatories on March 10, 1989. No 
evidence was introduced below about what steps, if any, were 
taken to prepare interrogatory responses, and BCBSU again 
objects to this impermissible and unfair assertion about facts 
outside the record. 
16. Paragraph thirty-one is true but irrelevant; 
actions taken by other defendants have no bearing on a 
determination of how extensively BCBSU participated in the case. 
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17. Paragraphs thirty-one and thirty-two are true. 
18. Paragraph thirty-four contains yet another 
unfounded, impermissible supplementation of the record with the 
assertion that the plaintiffs were not relieved of their 
obligation to respond to interrogatories from BCBSU until 
April 4. BCBSU believes that communication occurred earlier/ 
but, in any event/ no evidence was introduced on this subject 
below, the record does not support this assertion/ and it 
cannot be relied upon on appeal. 
19. Paragraphs thirty-five and thirty-six are true. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The district court's decision- is not based upon 
findings of fact which are reversible only if clearly 
erroneous. The district court concluded that BCBSU had waived 
its right to compel arbitration on account of its conduct in 
the litigation prior to invoking this remedy. The facts about 
the participation of BCBSU in the litigation and the actions 
taken by the plaintiffs on account of the participation of 
BCBSU below are a matter of record. No evidentiary hearing was 
held/ no determination was made about the credibility of any 
witness and no evidentiary conflicts were resolved. Therefore, 
this court is free to draw its own legal conclusion from the 
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undisputed facts and should reverse the erroneous conclusion 
reached by the district court. 
Plaintiffs failed to establish below that BCBSU caused 
them material prejudice by extensive participation in 
litigation before seeking to compel arbitration. Plaintiffs 
argue that a delay in asserting the right to arbitration will 
cause a delay in their recovery. This argument is of no avail 
since there is no reason to assume that they will recover 
anything in this lawsuit. Proof of delay is not proof of 
prejudice. Furthermore/ the plaintiffs did not spend 
significant time or money responding to motions filed by BCBSU, 
or discovery initiated by BCBSU, nor did they prepare for trial 
in reliance on the expectation that BCBSU would forgo 
arbitration. Since there is no evidence which would support a 
finding of prejudice to the plaintiffs by the conduct of BCBSU, 
the trial court's conclusion cannot be upheld under any 
standard of review. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THIS CASE IS SUBJECT TO REVIEW UNDER THE 
"CORRECTION OF ERROR" STANDARD 
Plaintiffs inaccurately characterize the trial courts' 
ruling as one based upon findings of fact which can only be 
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reversed if clearly erroneous. In reality, the trial court 
resolved no factual issues in reaching its decision; reviewing 
undisputed facts about the participation of all parties in the 
litigation, the court concluded that BCBSU waived its right to 
compel arbitration. 
As the United States Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit said in Rush v. Oppenheimer & Co., 779 F.2d 885, 887 
(2nd Cir. 1985): 
Where, as here, the concern is whether the 
undisputed facts of defendants' pre-trial 
participation in the litigation satisfy the 
standard for waiver, the question of waiver 
of arbitration is one of law, (citations 
omitted) and is fully reviewable on appeal 
free from the clearly erroneous standard of 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a) applicable to factual 
findings by the district court. 
In accord: Fisher v. A.G. Becker Paribas Inc., 791 F.2d 691, 
693 (9th Cir. 1986). 
No evidentiary hearing was held below and no testimony 
was taken on the issue raised by this appeal. The plaintiffs 
attempt to characterize the court's decision as fact finding by 
arguing that the court reviewed "many sources of information 
including the Uninsured's verified complaint and attached 
exhibits, affidavits of each of the eleven uninsureds and 
attached exhibits, the written contract between BCBSU and the 
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Uninsureds, summaries of deposition testimony . . . etc." 
(Brief of Appellees, p. 12.) However/ none of these materials 
contain evidence which was relied upon by the court in ruling 
on the issue of waiver. 
The plaintiffs below resisted the motion to compel 
arbitration on several grounds; among them that the right to 
arbitrate was waived, but also because plaintiffs claim they 
were not properly notified of the inclusion of an arbitration 
provision in their contract, and that the provision was 
otherwise unenforceable. The affidavits of the plaintiffs went 
only to the question whether they received notice of the 
arbitration amendment, with some admitting receipt and some 
denying it. (R 608-648). The trial court, however, never 
reached this issue. 
Similarly, the court's review of the contract and the 
complaint would only have been for the purpose of determining 
whether the complaint alleged causes of action which were 
within the scope of the arbitration provision, another issue 
not addressed by the court. As to depositions, the record 
discloses that none were published. No deposition testimony 
was relied upon, or cited, except in plaintiffs' persistent 
attempts to inject arguments about the merits of the dispute 
into the resolution of this procedural issue. 
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The question of waiver, as explained in BCBSU's 
opening brief, rests solely upon a determination of whether 
BCBSU's participation in the lawsuit prior to demanding 
arbitration was substantial, and significantly prejudicial to 
the plaintiffs. The participation of BCBSU and of other 
parties in the litigation is a matter of record, reflected by 
filing dates, the presence and absence of discovery notices, 
etc. No conflicting testimony or evidentiary disputes had to 
be resolved to identify the facts about the parties' conduct in 
the litigation. 
In Matter of Adoption of Infant Anonymous, 760 P.2d 
916, 918 (Utah App. 1988), the Utah Court of Appeals reviewed 
the decision of a trial court that a parent's consent to 
adoption was not knowingly given. The court described the 
applicable standard of review as follows: 
Normally we would review this determination 
by the factfinder under the standard set 
forth in Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a), giving great 
deference to the trial judge's ability to 
assess the credibility of witnesses and 
setting aside the finding only if clearly 
erroneous. However, because no evidentiary 
hearing was held, Judge Moffat had before 
him only the affidavits of the natural 
mother, the counselor, and the obstetrician, 
described above, the transcript of the June 
24 appearance before Judge Murphy, and the 
natural mother's written consent to adoption 
executed that day. Because the trial 
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court's finding was based solely on these 
written materials and involved no assessment 
of witness credibility or competency, this 
court is in as good a position as the trial 
court to examine the evidence de novo and 
determine the facts. 
It is true, as pointed out by plaintiffs, that the 
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit (unlike the Second and 
Ninth Circuits) held in Price v. Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc., 
791 F.2d 1156, 1159 (5th Cir. 1986) that a finding of waiver of 
the right to arbitrate is a legal conclusion, but that the 
findings upon which the conclusions were based are predicate 
questions of fact which may not be overturned unless clearly 
erroneous. However, even courts which might adhere to this 
mixed standard of review note that where the trial court makes 
no predicate findings of fact, the decision is treated on 
appeal as a purely legal one which "follows from the undisputed 
facts of defendants' pre-trial participation in litigation", 
Page v. Moseley, Hallgarten, Estabrook & Weeden, Inc., 806 F.2d 
291, 294, note 2 (1st Cir. 1986). 
In its memorandum decision and separate order the 
trial court did no more than state that "[t]he court finds that 
Blue Cross & Blue Shield has participated in the litigation 
since being joined as a party defendant to such an extent that 
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any right to arbitration has been waived and that the 
arbitration would work a substantial prejudice on the remaining 
parties" (R 709, 720) (Appendix to Opening Brief of BCBSU). 
These are not "predicate factual findings" which are entitled 
to deference on appeal. The trial court looked at a record 
which contained no testimony or evidentiary conflicts and 
reached a legal conclusion which was wrong. This court should 
correct its error. 
POINT II 
THE RECORD DOES NOT SUPPORT A FINDING THAT 
BCBSU SUBSTANTIALLY PARTICIPATED IN 
LITIGATION TO THE PREJUDICE OF THE PLAINTIFFS 
Apparently, the parties do not disagree about the 
legal test which applies to a claim of waiver of the right to 
arbitrate: a party waives an otherwise enforceable right to 
arbitrate a dispute only by substantial participation in 
litigation which materially prejudices the party opposing 
arbitration. Furthermore, plaintiffs do not deny that there is 
a presumption in favor of arbitration and that one who claims 
waiver bears a heavy burden of proof; Moses H. Cone Memorial 
Hospital v. Mercury Construction Corp., 460 U.S. 1 (1983); (see 
also other authorities cited under Point I of the opening brief 
of BCBSU). 
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Whether this court applies a "correction of error" or 
a "clearly erroneous" standard, the record does not support the 
trial court's finding of waiver. Except for those few cases 
which hold that mere failure to assert the defense of 
arbitration in an answer constitutes waiver (a legal position 
the plaintiffs themselves do not advocate), neither party has 
identified any case in which participation in litigation as 
minimal as that of BCBSU was held to constitute a waiver. 
Plaintiffs persist in comparing the facts of the case 
at bar to those of Reid Burton Const. Co. Inc. v. Carpenters 
District Council, 614 F.2d 698 (10th Cir. 1980). In the Reid 
Burton case, a labor union sought to compel arbitration after 
the trial of the case had begun, having previously disavowed 
the applicability of the arbitration contract, and after 
participating in a pre-trial conference without raising the 
arbitration defense. In contrast, the trial court below 
specifically found that the case was not ready for a trial 
setting (R 458), no hearing had been held on any matter before 
arbitration was sought, and no motion had been filed by BCBSU 
seeking relief of any kind. 
More importantly, the trial court never made a clear 
factual finding of prejudice and nothing in the record supports 
a finding that plaintiffs were prejudiced by BCBSU's delay in 
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moving to compel arbitration. The trial court, as noted, 
stated that "arbitration would work a substantial prejudice on 
the remaining parties." (R 720). This observation reveals the 
flaws in the trial court's legal analysis. It is wholly-
irrelevant whether other defendants are burdened by 
arbitration; they are not subject to the arbitration agreement 
and would have no standing to claim it was waived.1/ 
Moreover, the question is not whether arbitration itself would 
prejudice the opposing party, but whether the delay in its 
assertion caused prejudice. 
Neither the trial court nor the plaintiffs have 
succeeded in explaining how the plaintiffs have been prejudiced 
by the timing of BCBSU1s arbitration motion. The plaintiffs 
continue to argue that a delay in moving to compel arbitration 
has delayed them in obtaining the relief they seek. This 
argument assumes that plaintiffs1 position on the merits is 
•1/ Plaintiffs argue under Point IV of their brief that the 
other parties will be prejudiced by having plaintiffs* claims 
against BCBSU subject to arbitration and that it will be 
inconvenient to everyone to proceed in separate forums. This 
"prejudice", as noted in the opening brief of BCBSU, is 
inherent in the finding that two of the parties agreed to 
arbitrate their dispute; it has nothing to do with the question 
whether delay has caused prejudice and is irrelevant to this 
appeal. Furthermore, none of the other parties did oppose the 
motion of BCBSU to compel arbitration. 
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correct and that they will obtain the relief they seek. No 
court addressing the question of prejudice starts with this 
assumption; it amounts to nothing more than the contention that 
delay itself proves prejudice, a position which is simply not 
the law, Rush v. Qppenheimer & Co., supra, 779 F.2d at 887, 
("It is beyond question that defendants' delay in seeking 
arbitration during approximately eight months of pretrial 
proceedings is insufficient by itself to constitute a waiver of 
the right to arbitrate, for in addition, prejudice to Rush must 
be demonstrated"). Furthermore, since arbitration is a 
streamlined process, it is impossible to know whether a delay 
in moving to compel arbitration will actually result in a delay 
of the disposition of the case, even if that question were 
dispositive. 
Instead, courts have almost invariably focused their 
analysis on whether the party seeking arbitration has filed 
motions or engaged in discovery which caused the opposing party 
to spend significant time and money it would not otherwise have 
expended; Rush v. Qppenheimer & Co., supra. Board of Educ. Taos 
Mun. v. The Architects, 103 N.M. 462, 709 P.2d 184 (N.M. 1985); 
Lee v. Grandcor Medical Systems, Inc., 702 F. Supp. 252 (D. 
Colo. 1988); Benqiovi v. Prudential-Bache Securities, Inc., 
[1984-1985 Transfer Binder], Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) § 92012 at 
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91,018 (D.D.C. April 25, 1985) (". . . plaintiff has been 
required to produce documents, answer deposition questions, and 
file an opposition to the summary judgment motion . . . In 
light of this delay in seeking arbitration and the resulting 
prejudice to plaintiff, Pru-Bache cannot now to [sic] rely on 
the Customer Agreement to compel arbitration.") 
BCBSU filed neither a motion for summary judgment nor 
any other motion but a motion to compel arbitration. 
Plaintiffs, unable to point to this frequently cited source of 
prejudice, are left having to contend that they were prejudiced 
by the participation of BCBSU in discovery. This position is 
untenable. 
BCBSU didn't schedule a single deposition. The 
depositions of the plaintiffs were taken by codefendants before 
BCBSU was ever named as a party. The only depositions taken 
after BCBSU was joined were depositions scheduled and taken by 
the plaintiffs. How could the plaintiffs have been prejudiced 
by the attendance of BCBSU at depositions they scheduled and 
took? Plaintiffs imply that they were prejudiced when BCBSU 
identified and produced a corporate spokesman for a deposition 
in response to their request. Plaintiffs have not shown, 
however, or even argued that they would not have sought this 
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discovery in arbitration^/ or that the results were wasteful 
rather than beneficial. 
Plaintiffs make the absurd argument that they were 
prejudiced by receiving interrogatory answers and documents 
from BCBSU. Most of the documents were already produced in 
response to a subpoena served upon BCBSU prior to being joined 
as a defendant. (R 180). Moreover, plaintiffs did not contend 
that they received documents or information which would not be 
sought or used in arbitration. 
Admittedly, BCBSU served discovery requests upon the 
plaintiffs which they were never required to answer. 
Plaintiffs improperly attempt to supplement the record on 
appeal with the assertions that they began preparing their 
responses the day they received them and nearly completed them 
before being relieved of the duty to answer. The record is 
devoid of any evidence that the plaintiffs expended time or 
resources responding to discovery from BCBSU and it is clear 
that BCBSU obtained no benefit from any such discovery. As the 
District Court for the District of Colorado observed, "courts 
generally have held that rights under an arbitration agreement 
are only waived where the parties have engaged in extensive 
2/ Discovery is permitted under the Utah Arbitration Act. 
See, Utah Code Ann. § 78-31a-6(3)(6). 
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pre-trial discovery, and where the party opposing arbitration 
will suffer material prejudice . . .M, Lee v. Grandcor Medical 
Systems, Inc., 702 F. Supp., at 255 (emphasis supplied). 
Without question, BCBSU was not a participant in extensive 
pre-trial discovery which materially prejudiced the plaintiffs. 
Finally, plaintiffs feebly attempt to bring themselves 
within the holding of cases that where one party has completed 
trial preparation before arbitrability is asserted, the other 
party has suffered prejudice. Plaintiffs improperly assert in 
their statement of facts that they began preparing their case 
against BCBSU in December, 1988 and completed "document 
preparation" for their case against BCBSU on March 10, 1989 
when they served BCBSU with interrogatories and requests. 
Again, the plaintiffs flout this court's rules by attempting to 
add evidence to the record which was not introduced below. Not 
only are these assertions irrelevant, but they lack 
credibility. Neither a trial nor a pre-trial was scheduled 
when BCBSU moved to compel arbitration. No party claimed below 
to have been near completion of discovery or involved in trial 
preparation. 
In this case, unlike many others where the issue is 
raised, BCBSU was only one of several defendants, and the other 
parties engaged in litigation for a year before it was joined. 
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In the four and one-half month interval between the answer and 
motion of BCBSU/ discovery proceeded exactly as it would have 
had BCBSU not been joined. Plaintiffs have not established any 
way in which their time and resources were wasted by the brief 
presence of BCBSU in the lawsuit. A finding of prejudice 
simply cannot be supported. 
CONCLUSION 
The facts which underlie this appeal were not disputed 
below. From the moment it was named as a defendant, BCBSU was 
engaged responding to a barrage of discovery from the 
plaintiffs and other parties. Its conduct in the litigation 
was wholly responsive. It filed no motions and obtained no 
discovery from other parties. As a result, the plaintiffs did 
not expend time and money litigating with BCBSU in ways that 
would be wasted if the matter is arbitrated. These facts are 
easily discernible from the record. 
The parties agree that BCBSU should be deemed to have 
waived its right to arbitrate only if it substantially 
participated in litigation to the material prejudice of the 
plaintiffs before seeking arbitration. Because the 
participation of BCBSU was neither substantial nor prejudicial, 
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it did not waive its right to arbitrate. The contrary-
conclusion of the district court should be reversed. 
DATED this /' day of October, 1990. 
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH 
By. 
David R. Money /(USB #38§7) 
Timothy C. Houp't (USB #1543) 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant 
Blue Cross Blue Shield of Utah 
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